Against sectarianism
Iraqi political figures have welcomed America's new strategy in Iraq, although some problems remain. Omayma Abdel-Latif reports
Plans by the United States to transfer power to an Iraqi provisional government is seen by some Iraqi political figures as "a positive move". Others remain sceptical, calling it an attempt to deflect criticism of the handling of Iraq's occupation and placate the American pubic in light of increasing attacks on US soldiers.
Leith Kubba, a respected Iraqi exile and a fellow of the Washington-based National Endowment for Democracy characterised the development as positive, regardless of the motivation. "It will right an old wrong," he told Al-Ahram Weekly, referring to the sectarian-based proportional representation in the selection of members for the Interim Governing Council (IGC). "Iraqis will now have a say in who represents them," he continued. Arab commentators warned that if this policy shift turns out to be a mere ploy to increase the popularity of the American president in an election year, already malign feelings against the US occupiers will be raised.
According to the plan, the details of which were revealed on Saturday at a press conference after talks between the IGC and US Chief Civil Administrator Paul Bremer, a provisional government will be granted full sovereignty by June 2004. The implementation of this plan rests on a number of required actions by the IGC. The IGC must adopt a basic set of governing principles and must also create a national assembly -- more specifically a transitional legislative assembly of representatives from Iraq's 18 provinces -- to select a provisional government.
A CPA spokesman declared that the assembly members will be "selected through democratic and transparent measures". As no mention was made of a direct popular election, the assembly will be seen as attempt to legitimise the IGC by broadening its political base and membership. Representatives of the currently marginalised social and political forces would concurrently feel more empowered.
The members of the transitional assembly will be selected by a 15-member group appointed by the IGC and heads of provisional municipalities. This assembly should be in place by the end of May 2004. It will meet to elect a provisional government, which will be granted full sovereignty by the end of June 2004, at which time occupation will be officially declared over. Both the CPA and the IGC will be disbanded. The plan is for a constitution to be ratified in December 2005, followed by general elections soon after.
The constitution will be drafted by convention. Conventional delegates will be elected at the provincial level by local tribal leaders, religious leaders and influential organisations. According to the Iraqi daily Azzaman, the plan also states that the IGC will be required to draft governing principles for the Iraqi state during the transitional period. These should be ratified by the end of 2004.
According to some Iraqi political figures, the plan raises a number of issues, the most important of which is the legitimacy of the IGC. The Iraqi people, they argue, see the Council as a symbol of the ethnic and sectarian divisions within the country. According to Alaa Al-Hashemi, a senior member of the Al-Daw'aa Party -- a prominent Shi'ite movement with grassroots support -- the composition of the IGC has led to the marginalisation of many political and social forces in Iraq.
"The decision to broaden the political base of the IGC through the transitional assembly is meant to deal with groups who are under-represented, or not represented at all within the current political environment. It is about time they joined ranks," Al- Hashemi told the Weekly in a telephone interview from Baghdad. The IGC has always demanded the swift transfer of power to the Iraqi people, he said, while acknowledging that the attacks carried out by Iraqi opposition groups has forced the Americans to comply. The IGC, he said, will call upon all political and social organisations in Iraq to present their list of candidates for the legislative assembly.
The 25-member IGC was formed last July in an attempt to give an Iraqi face to the US-led occupation. The membership is proportionally representative according to sectarian and ethnic demographics in the country. This fact has angered many members of civil and political organisations, and has also set a troubling precedent. Since its inception, the IGC has come in for harsh criticism, mainly for failing to metamorphose into an effective decision-making body, and also because many of its members are formerly exiled Iraqis who lack any constituency of support on the ground.
The involvement of the IGC in the transitional process is not welcomed by many figures, including Kubba. He fears that the IGC might have too much control over the candidate selection process. Which is why, says Kubba, the IGC should not be the only body in charge of establishing the transition. "An elected body and not the IGC should set the rules of the transition process. Many don't understand why neither the IGC, CPA or Bremer himself don't want to resort to elections to select candidates," Kubba exclaimed. He urged Iraqis to form pressure groups and pressure the IGC into including a broader selection of representatives to set the rules for transition. Along with other Iraqi intellectuals, Kubba plans to meet with leaders of Arab representatives to encourage them to partake in future politics.
"Most likely, the IGC would want the process to go through its network of alliances and representatives," he said. Kubba argued that because of its sectarian and ethnic-based politics the IGC has lost its credibility amongst Iraq's major Arab tribes, making the task of inclusion all the more difficult. Historically, says Kubba, the only two forces that were able to give momentum to any political process or alliance in Iraq were the religious establishment or the leading Arab tribes.
Some analysts say that the plan has failed to address one of Iraq's most pressing transitional problems, namely security. One observer explained that in order for the political plan to succeed, the deteriorating domestic situation must be addressed concurrently. As one observer pointed out, this does not mean deploying more ground forces or engaging in ruthless military tactics, as is presently the case. This means attempting to include representatives of the eight major Sunni tribes in the political process, and assuring them of their important role in the politics of the struggling country.
Al-Ahram Weekly Online : 20 - 26 November 2003 (Issue No. 665)
Located at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/665/re6.htm