Principles and personalities
In 2003, improved prospects for peace in southern Sudan were offset by the eruption of war in western Sudan, writes Gamal Nkrumah
It has been hard for the Sudanese to reach a conclusive peace agreement to end the 20-year-old war in southern Sudan that has claimed the lives of some two million people and rendered five million homeless. They hope their oil-rich economy, potentially the Arab world's breadbasket and one of Africa's wealthiest nations, will bounce back.
The Sudanese government and the country's largest armed opposition group, the Sudan's People's Liberation Army (SPLA), have entered the final phase of peace talks. They are scheduled to reach a final peace agreement by the end of the year, or early in 2004.
The prospects for peace in Sudan dominated the Sudanese political scene in 2003, but war still continues in parts of the country, hampering social and economic development. The war has shifted from the south to the west of the country, but there have been remarkable and positive changes of perspective among the warring Sudanese parties that cannot be ignored. A strong sense of expectation is prevalent among the different Sudanese factions, with the notable exception of the armed groups in the western part of the country.
All sides are in agreement that even if peace is achieved, political reform must follow. Indeed, peace and democracy are two sides of the same coin.
Throughout the year, the pace of peace talks between the Sudanese government and SPLA slowed down because of disagreement over such vital issues as power-sharing and wealth- sharing and, in particular, oil revenues. Other contentious issues between the Sudanese government and the SPLA are the religious status of the national capital Khartoum and the political status of three regions, technically in northern Sudan. These three regions are the Nuba Mountains in southern Kordofan, the Abeyei region in western Kordofan, and the Angassana region of southern Blue Nile. The SPLA claims considerable grass-root support in these three peripheral areas.
The SPLA says, however, that the three politically marginalised, economically disadvantaged and underdeveloped regions should be administered as part of southern Sudan. In cultural and ethnic composition, these regions are more similar to southern Sudan.
The other bone of contention is the application of Islamic Shari'a laws in Khartoum, which the Sudanese government insists upon but the SPLA opposes, pushing instead for a secular capital.
Concerted international action is now needed if the momentum for peace is not to run out of steam. The Sudanese government and the SPLA are hard pressed to prove that the peace talks in Kenya are making progress. The Sudanese government, however, is under intense international pressure to concede serious concessions to southerners. Khartoum has been in the confessional box since 11 September, and in 2003 Khartoum signalled repentance for its terrorist past. Sudan gave shelter to Saudi dissident Osama Bin Laden in the 1990s and Al-Qa'eda had extensive political and economic interests in the country at the time. These ties have been severed. But opposition Sudanese parties -- both northern and southern -- say that the authorities in Khartoum were ruthless towards opposition forces where they should have been conciliatory.
Southern Sudan in particular bore the brunt of the Sudanese conflict and, Sudanese opposition forces argue, must therefore be offered adequate compensation.
In 2003, the Sudanese authorities made it abundantly clear that they do want to institute a new political dispensation in the country. Not only has Khartoum made a serious commitment to peace in southern Sudan, but it has made overtures to northern-based opposition groups.
The chief ideologue of militant Islam in Sudan, Hassan Al-Turabi, was released from house arrest in October. Moreover, he was given a free rein to indulge in political activity -- no strings attached.
The PNC broke away from Sudan's ruling National Congress, which is headed by President Al-Beshir, in 1999 after a fallout between Al-Beshir and his one-time political ally Al-Turabi, former speaker of the Sudanese Parliament. Sudanese President Omar Hassan Al-Beshir was once a key ally of Al-Turabi and champion of his Islamist ideals. Turabi now feigns a democratic orientation. Beshir seems certain to follow suit.
Al-Turabi's Popular National Congress (PNC) competes with the Sudanese government in the same political constituency and on the same political turf. Al-Turabi was the chief architect of the radical Islamisation and Arabisation campaigns that were aimed at alienating and politically marginalising southern Sudanese people. His now-defunct National Islamic Front was instrumental in arming pro-Sudanese government tribal militias in western and southern parts of the country.
Al-Turabi is still widely regarded as a dangerous Islamist firebrand. His unconditional return to the Sudanese political arena was testament not only to the enduring popularity of Turabi himself, but to the Sudanese government's softened position towards its opponents.
Al-Turabi's PNC signed a memorandum for peace and understanding in Switzerland with the SPLA in 1999 after Al-Turabi broke ranks with Al-Beshir. Today both men have made much political capital out of negotiating with the SPLA. Both Al-Beshir and Al-Turabi say they want to win over the southerners.
In another unprecedented development, the Sudanese Vice- President Ali Osman Mohamed Taha met with Mohamed Osman Al-Mirghani the leader of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), the umbrella opposition organisation grouping the SPLA, and other mainly northern Sudanese opposition parties, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The two men signed a landmark peace accord.
Al-Turabi's party refused to join the NDA, which has its headquarters in the Eritrean capital, Asmara. But there are ongoing talks between the various opposition groups in Sudan.
The talks between the various Sudanese opposition groups are important in themselves, but they pale into insignificance when compared with the peace talks in Kenya between the Sudanese government and the SPLA.
These talks are taking place in Naivasha, 80 kilometres northwest of the Kenyan capital Nairobi under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), a regional organisation which groups seven East African countries, including Sudan. Kenya is the current IGAD ministerial sub- committee on Sudan.
But by bringing the right array of incentives to bear, IGAD, in conjunction with European Union countries, Switzerland and Norway, have made some progress in the peace talks. Even more critically important has been the political intervention of the US.
Even the decision to reverse the ban and release the country's leading militant Islamist ideologue Hassan Al-Turabi from house release did not erase the sense of alarm and dismay at the opening of another warfront in a war-weary country.
As prospects for peace in southern Sudan improved, however, the security situation in western Sudan sharply deteriorated in 2003.
Perhaps the most disheartening development this year, was the eruption of war in western Sudan. Again peace talks in Chad to bridge the political gap between the government and armed opposition in western Sudan have floundered.
The deplorable economic and social conditions in western Sudan gained more attention than ever with the escalation of violence in Darfur.
In February, a rebellion erupted in Darfur in which 3,000 people died and 500,0000 were rendered homeless.
Two main armed opposition groups have emerged on the western Sudanese political scene. The more vociferous is the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) which signed a truce with the Sudanese government in September. The second group, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) has not signed a truce or begun talks with the government. JEM is reputed to be closely linked to Al- Turabi's PNC and is Islamist in its orientation.
The SLA, on the other hand, groups left-leaning organisations. Communists, the Ba'athists and other groups are also active in Darfur, but the SLA and JEM are the two main armed factions.
The people of western Sudan, including Darfur, have been thoroughly Islamised for almost a millennium. They have not, however, been Arabised like most of the people of the northern Sudanese Nile Valley -- with the notable exception of the Nubians. They therefore encounter the racially oppressive situations that face the southern Sudanese.
The SLA, not to be confused with the southern Sudanese-based SPLA, has been fighting government forces for the improvement of social and economic conditions in Darfur and for the right of the inhabitants of Darfur to have more of a say in the decision- making process. The SLA, which used to be known as the Darfur Liberation Movement, founded in August 2001, argues that Darfur has suffered for decades from the neglect of successive Sudanese governments and urges decision makers in Khartoum to officially recognise the impoverished region's special needs.
Many Sudanese observers now believe that the Sudanese political reform and democratisation process must take into account the interests of all marginalised groups including those of the western Sudan. Organisations like JEM and SLA must be incorporated into the peace process. Peace in Sudan is not only dependent on a peace deal between the Sudanese government and the SPLA, but a comprehensive settlement incorporating JEM and the SLA.
It is widely hoped that with peace secured in the south, peace will also prevail in the west.
In the final analysis, the political future of Sudan seems destined to be moulded by the same old rival personalities -- Al- Beshir, Al-Turabi, Garang, Al-Mahdi and Al-Mirghani -- who have dominated the political scene for the past two decades. For better or for worse, the likelihood of the participation of fresh, more youthful faces appears highly improbable.
Al-Ahram Weekly Online : 25 - 31 December 2003 (Issue No. 670)
Located at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/670/re8.htm