The categories of knowledge
By Mohamed 'Abduh
The objects of our knowing are divided into three categories: that which is contingent, that which is necessarily self-existent and that which is inherently impossible of existence. We name the third that which of itself is non-existent: the necessarily self- existing that which is of itself: the contingent that which does not exist of itself but which exists, or not, according to the presence or absence of that which gives it existence, and becomes necessary or possible by an external other. The notion of that the existence of which is impossible is of course a figurative thing, for if anything is to be thought of as a true object of knowledge it must really exist so that the concept of it can be formed. The essentially non-existent is clearly not thus. Nevertheless, the concept of it is argumentatively necessary as an act of imagination.
The principle of the impossible. The inherently impossible of existence is that whose existence is inconceivable. Non- existence is inseparable from the very nature of its case. If existence were to be postulated of it, its very essence would be negated; it would, so to speak, be self-falsified. The impossible of existence has no being: it is absolutely and necessarily non- existent. the mind can formulate no existent image for it, as we have said. It therefore does not exist, either in fact or in thought.
The principles of the contingent. The principle of the contingent is that it is neither existent nor non-existent except by some external cause, since neither of these alternatives is inherent in it and either is equally possible. If either were to be asserted of it without such cause this would mean the superiority of one of two equals over the other, which is manifestly impossible.
Another principle of the contingent is that when it exists it does so as an 'accident'. For it has been established that it only exists by prior cause. To say, therefore, that it exists prior to the existence of its cause is obviously false. For otherwise the dependent would be preceding that on which it depends, which is contrary to the whole notion of dependence. This has already been shown and is excluded ex hypothesi. But if we say, secondly, that the contingent comes into being simultaneously with its cause, this is likewise impossible. For then the two would be equally existent and the question of which was cause and which effect would be open. And this mind cannot brook, inasmuch as there is no reason whereby the cause and effect can be identified. The third, and only, alternative is that the contingent comes into being after the cause: its cause is in existence before it and since the existence of every dependent thing is preceded by its non-existence, every contingent must be said to be so 'dependent' or created.
In its non-existence, the contingent has no need of an existent cause. For non-existence is negative and a negative has no need of becoming existent. So the contingent can be non-existent, either for lack of causation unto it, or for lack of continuance of what caused it. For existence, it necessarily has need of a cause, since nothing cannot be the origin of existence. The existent, if dependent, or created, must be brought into being by a creation. this is entirely evident.
Just as the contingent needs a cause to originate its existence, so it needs a cause for its continuance in being. We have shown that the contingent is not of necessary or self-existence and that it only comes into existence by an external or anterior cause. Therein is a state which may be said to be inherent in the contingent and always attaching to it. The contingent can never be in a state of necessary self-existence: in all circumstances it remains in need of that which gives it being out of non-existence, and this is true both of genesis and perpetuation.
'Cause' in the foregoing means that which creates and gives existence. It may also be described as the originator, the original cause, the operative cause, the real efficient cause, and other such expressions of different construction but roughly identical meaning. Sometimes the cause is so named for the reason that by it as a state or condition the contingent comes to exist, being necessary to the genesis of the contingent though the latter has no need of it for continuance. It may be that the cause will need to be present and then need to be absent, as for example, the builder who is a necessary agent to the coming to be of a house, but can yet die and the house abide. The builder is not the bestower of existence upon the house, though his handiwork, his mental activity and the exercise of his will are all a necessary condition for the existence of the house and its particular form.
In sum, then, there is a difference between the contingent's general dependence on conditions and its actual derivation of existence from something. its dependence may be on something which is and then ceases to be. The second step in walking, for example, depends upon the first, but the first does not bestow existence on the second. For then it would be imperative that it co-exist with it. The fact, of course, is that the second does not come into being until the first had passed away, whereas derivation of existence must be from something which antecedently has existence and gives it to the 'receiver' or 'deriver', so that the existence of the latter turns on the existence of the former and cannot be without it, independently, in any of its states.
The real existence of the contingent. We see things in existence which earlier did not exist, and others which cease after having been: trees, plants and animals, for example. These 'existers' might theoretically be classified as impossible, necessary or contingent. The first, however, must be ruled out since the impossible of existence never exists. The second must also be excluded, since the necessarily existent is not contingent, does not pass, and non-existence cannot be asserted of it, and has never been true of it, as will appear below, when we deal with the necessarily existing. So then the third alternative is the right one. the things referred to are contingently and emphatically existent.
(The existence of the contingent requires the necessarily existing.)
It is clear that all contingents in existence taken together constitute a contingent. And all contingence needs a cause to give it being. thus the collectivity of contingents in turn requires a creator or originating cause. It is impossible that this should be the sum of the contingencies, since that would involve a thing being antecedent to itself. And it is impossible that the creator should be part of the collectivity, since this would be to constitute a thing its own cause and cause of all that preceded it (if the crating part were not the first and of itself if it were). Both these suggestions are plainly absurd. Clearly the whole range of contingents must have a cause prior to it and the only non-contingent cause is the necessarily existing. For there is nothing prior to the contingent save the impossible and the necessary. The former has no existence. Therefore there remains only the necessary. So it is proved that the contingents that are have a cause of existence that must necessarily exist.
Furthermore, the contingents that exist do so equally whether they be finite or infinite. If we were to say that this existence had its source within itself, or in the modes of the contingents, it would be untenable, on the ground of what has already been shown in respect of contingents, namely that no mode of the contingents is outside them. it is in the necessarily existing.
Chapter two from Risalat al-Tauhid, The Theology of Unity , Muhammad 'Abduh, translated from the Arabic by Ishaq Musa'ad and Kenneth Cragg, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966.
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