Al-Ahram Weekly | Region | Unenviable choices

Detlev Mehlis' initial report on the assassination of Rafik Al-Hariri raises new political scenarios in the Middle East. Al-Ahram Weekly provides special in-depth coverage and expert analysis (see opposite page) on the various political and legal issues stemming from the investigation's findings

Unenviable choices

Syria faces tough accusations concerning involvement in the assassination of Rafik Al-Hariri. It may choose to do nothing, but it must at least choose, writes Mohamed El-Sayed Said*

The Mehlis report traps Syria in a snare difficult to escape. The next significant step will be demanding Syria and Lebanon hand over prominent security officials the report accuses of involvement in the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Al-Hariri. The actual form this demand takes, however, may take time to develop, given the opposition of the United States to the International Criminal Court and France's insistence upon it. It is likely that the Americans will succeed in imposing the formation of a special international court such as that which tries alleged war criminals of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such a development would be strong indication that this court would eventually prosecute the Lebanese and Syrian presidents themselves, a scenario that could be likened to an earthquake violently jolting Arab politics and creating a unique crisis in international-Arab relations.

All of Syria's choices are fraught. But more dangerous than the difficulty of the choices, in and of themselves, would be for Syria to bounce back and forth between possible plans of action, further tarnishing its image without ever finding a way out of the trap that has been set for it. It is in Syria's interests to consider its options well, select the optimal approach, and stick with it through to the end. The problem is determining which route is the best. In theory, it has two primary and two secondary options.

Its first primary option is to accept the will of the UN Security Council, including the handover of any senior security officials that the international examining magistrate may call for trial before an international court. This option complies with the Syrian regime's philosophy of continuing to integrate within the world order, avoiding confrontation, so far as is possible, with the West on this issue -- a confrontation whose consequences Syria cannot bear in the long run. Yet Syria's adoption of this course of action would be limited, absolving the Syrian president of responsibility for Al-Hariri's blood in the sense that he had no foreknowledge of the assassination. The Syrian president would then be able to save himself and the reputation of his country at the price of sacrificing a few senior officials.

On the other hand, Syria may attempt to create the conditions of another scenario, avoiding international confrontation and anything else unsavoury in bringing members of the accused security cadre before a Syrian court, in the manner Sudan did for war crimes trials in Darfur. Such a scenario would rule out the likelihood of the handover of prominent security officials to international courts, which could lead to accusations, even a trial, of the Syrian president in turn. This scenario would also conform to statements the Syrian president himself made when he told the American television station CNN that he would charge any Syrian deemed to be involved in Al-Hariri's assassination with treason.

This option is flawed, however, in that it might not preclude confrontation unless several powerful member states in the Security Council mount a challenge to European and American will and help the Syrian state find an out to its dilemma. Until now, there are no precedents to render this alternative an option. Russia, for example, was forced to tacitly support the trial of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic who it had stood by during the Bosnian civil war. Further, the United States may actively fight this scenario, as it would not, at the end of the day, help it make significant political gains over Damascus in bringing the Syrian president to stand humiliated before an international court.

The other primary option for Syria is obstinacy; rejection of the Mehlis report and the labelling of it as politically biased, perhaps even serving America and Israel. This is how Syrian officials first reacted to publicity around the draft report. In this scenario, Syria would have to prepare to weather the consequences, which may include the imposition of sanctions by the Security Council or even an American military escalation. The worst consequence of this option, however, would be that accusations would remain hanging around the neck of the Syrian regime, including the neck of the president himself. The sting of this accusation will only recede via a political solution or a judicial ruling.

Further worsening the negative balance of this scenario, the international political mindset can't fathom Al-Hariri's assassination haven taking place without the approval of the highest political official of the country. This places the president before a double-headed dilemma: either he had prior knowledge of the assassination, which makes him politically and criminally responsible, or that he didn't, which incites doubt as to his fitness to rule.

Despite this, however, obstinacy remains advantageous in that it spares Syria international humiliation and may save its president -- likely the most important objective for the Syrian state -- from standing before an international court, if he was indeed involved. If Syria picks this option, however, it will be obliged to retain the accused as dismissing them would indicate guilt.

A shadow scenario, or second order choice, emerges from the same philosophy but involves Syria escalating beyond mere obstinacy. In this scenario, Syria would not stop at accusing Judge Mehlis of political bias but would go on to accuse the United States and Israel of committing similar or even worse crimes and demanding the trial of American and Israeli leaders before a similar international court. Syria may decide to increase the pressure and end the conflict by bringing its enemy down with it, whether in Lebanon or Iraq.

This choice is certainly flawed in that it places Syria in confrontation with the international community, in particular the United States and Europe. In all likelihood, it would be suicide. It makes no distinction between the security of Syria and that of its political system and the interests of its political and security establishment. Despite this, however, the Syrian leadership may conclude that it is far worse to appear weak, giving in to what the Americans and French want, and far better for the worst to arrive on its own steam. The Syrian regime may also wish to escalate the confrontation so that it is no longer restricted to the case of Al-Hariri's assassination but rather expands into an Arab-Euro-American confrontation. Widening the scope of American persecution of Arab leaders and their states would, nonetheless, serve the goals of the Israeli right and the Zionist movement in general.

All of these choices are difficult and none is entirely in Syria's hands. Their consequences would affect the entire Arab world and may divide it more than it is fractured already, leading to further internal ruptures. Whatever the advantages of these scenarios, Syria must consult with other Arab states in making its selection. Most important, at times of crisis one must take a decision and stick with it, rather than wavering back and forth.

* The writer is deputy director of Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.