Al-Qaeda in Egypt?
Plain repression will not stem the proliferation of radical Islamist groups, writes Ammar Ali Hassan*
The recent arrest of an Al-Qaeda cell in Egypt underscores what may be an emerging trend in the radical Islamist movement. The stage seems to be set for the rise of isolated groups that are disgruntled by the tactical retractions made by Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya and by the fragmentation of the Egyptian Jihad, that disapprove of the pacifist orientation of the Muslim Brotherhood and the purely religious proselytising approach of such Salafi societies as the Tabligh wal Daawa (Preaching and Summoning), and that are averse to the introversion of the Sufi orders. It therefore appears that these small groups will opt for one of two courses: to remain isolated cells committed to violence but restricting their range of operations, or to sign up with Al-Qaeda, if not organisationally then at least in terms of general outlook and strategy.
The most salient factor to have increased the likelihood of the emergence of isolated, independent cells is the tightening of national security in conjunction with the close international cooperation in anti-terrorism. Such conditions are inimical to geographically widespread organisations, such as Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya and Al-Jihad, whose networks covered a large area of the country. The larger and more geographically dispersed the organisation, the easier it is for security agencies to monitor, infiltrate and pursue it, and all the more so if the organisation is hierarchically based, as is Al-Jihad, or prefers to keep a part of its operations above the surface, as is the case with Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya. Isolated cells, on the other hand, have a greater chance of evading surveillance, especially if they are adept at covert activities, keep their operations to a minimum and are skilled at blending in with their immediate social environment without arousing suspicions.
But the ideological retractions of Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya also had a profound effect. Set down in the six pamphlets entitled "The Conceptual Rectification Series", issued by the leadership of this Islamist organisation, the reorientation generated considerable disarray among the ranks of youth inclined towards joining the radical Islamist movement. Whereas in the past most of these would have almost automatically have enlisted in Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya or Al-Jihad, on the basis of these organisations' ideological or theological aims and outlook, their grassroots connections and their strong recruiting capacities, the situation is now more muddled. The resultant "fluidity", in turn, could precipitate rifts in these two organisations and the emergence of splinter groups, which would keep their new identities totally secret in order to avert police surveillance and may ultimately evolve into isolated "pockets" within the larger radical Islamist movement. Nor should we ignore the attendant possibility that the currently detained leaders of the former fringe Islamist organisations, which had risen to some 70 groups during the 1970s and 1980s, could reproduce these organisations after their release from prison, taking advantage of the new "fluidity" and promoting themselves as champions of the hardcore militancy abandoned by old, "turncoat" radicals.
A third factor favouring the growth of isolated fringe groups involves funding. Formerly, Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya and Al-Jihad could easily receive financial assistance from abroad, from individual supporters or sympathisers, from similar groups, from purported philanthropic societies, or even from governments seeking to undermine the Egyptian regime. This is no longer the case. The feverish anti-terrorist drive, spearheaded by the US, has succeeded in turning off many of those financial taps. As a result, militant Islamists bent on adhering to their radical agenda have little alternative but to steer clear of known leaderships, to rely on local sources of funding to avoid drawing attention to themselves, and organising themselves into small autonomous underground units with, at most, no more than an abstract link to Al-Qaeda.
In general, these radical fringe cells will probably have a very limited future. Some will be caught in the net of the security agencies in the course of their anti- terrorist surveillance activities. Others will fragment and dissolve on their own accord as the result of internal squabbling over tactics and objectives. Those that decide to lay low and retain their cohesion until the time is ripe will probably face the same fate as the radical groups that preceded them once they do break their silence and engage society and the state: imprisonment and/or equivocation on principles. However, there still exists the possibility that a few groups elude the grasp of security agencies. They could, for example, work slowly and with extreme caution, to build up relations with a network of radical Islamist organisations abroad that over recent years has come to pose one of the most formidable challenges to the Egyptian regime. In a like manner, they could attempt to expand locally by recruiting disaffected members from the more established groups, such as Al-Jihad and Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya.
If the government is to effectively forestall the proliferation of such radical fringe groups, it must reach the conviction that a confrontationist approach against the larger Islamist movement will not serve this objective. Indeed, there are distinct political and socio- economic advantages to be gained from absorbing Islamists into the political party system, not least of which is the diffusion of discontent. However, this entails a price in the form of the more equitable distribution of resources, fighting corruption and combating intolerance of those who enter politics beneath the banner of Islam, and, in the long term, in the form of promoting an educational-cultural system that prioritises rational and scientific thought without prejudicing Islamic doctrinal and moral tenets and that, in general, seeks to instil a more profound understanding of Islam and its inherent spirit of tolerance and moderation.
To handle radical Islamists solely through recourse to force, as though they were the scattered remnants of a routed enemy, is to court another period of violence and terrorism. As it has demonstrated so many times in the past, the radical Islamist movement is very adept at surviving, regardless of the degrees of physical and moral repression exerted against it. It has shown itself capable of lurking underground, altering tactics to avert clashes with the authorities and, simultaneously, leaving its imprint on many forms of social and individual behaviour while carving for itself a social and religious niche of legitimacy.
* The writer is director of the Middle East Studies and Research Centre, Cairo.
Al-Ahram Weekly Online : Located at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/857/op2.htm